We demonstrate the sensitivity of the location of downstream firms, engaged in sequential spatial competition, to the vertical structure of an industry where no downstream firm can produce all varieties demanded. JEL Classification Code: L13, L42, D43, R32
Introduction
In this paper, we extend Braid (2008) to capture the sensitivity of equilibrium locations of downstream firms, selling different varieties of a product, to the vertical structure of an industry when spatial moves are sequential. Braid (2008) showed that the equilibrium locations of two firms are partially centralized to the socially optimal extent if there is spatial price discrimination, and if each firm has two out of three products, or else one variety of a differentiated product with some consumers indifferent between
varieties. In what follows, we demonstrate the effect of sequential moves by downstream firms engaged in spatial competition in a vertically related industry where no firm can produce all the varieties that consumers demand.
Model and Propositions
Consider a vertically related industry with one upstream firm ( M ) producing an Absent the possibility of a merger, M charges a uniform wholesale price j w and a fixed fee j F that extracts all of the profits from each downstream firm.
The profits of R 2 , from selling varieties V and W, are
The first order condition for profit maximization yields R 2 's reaction function
The profits of R 1 , from selling varieties U and W, are
Solving the first order conditions for R 1 's profit-maximization and plugging this solution into (2), we obtain
This leads to our first proposition.
Proposition I. Absent the possibility of any merger, the Nash equilibrium locations of the two downstream firms, engaged in spatial competition in a vertically related industry, are
for the leader and
for the follower.
If there is a merger between M and R 1 , M sets   
Figure 2. Vertical Merger with Downstream Leader
This leads to our next two propositions. 
Proposition 2. If the downstream leader merges upstream, the Nash equilibrium locations of the two downstream firms, engaged in spatial competition in a vertically related industry, are
Solving the first order conditions for maximizing R 1 's profit (3) and plugging this solution into (10), we obtain 
Conclusion
In this paper we have taken a step forward along the path of efforts that continue to capture the implications of the vertical structure 4 of an industry for the location of downstream firms that move sequentially. We have shown that, with sequentially moving downstream firms that can not produce all the varieties that consumers demand, the merged firm (notwithstanding the order of its move) will locate farther away from the social optimum than will the firm outside the merger. 5 A couple of interesting extensions, we are currently working on, include a) allowing incomplete information when each downstream firm's unit cost is unknown 6 to its rival and b) endogenizing the sequence of moves by adding a prior stage where each firm chooses when to pick its location..
